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Abstract
This Note analyzes respective legal arguments that Ukraine and the Crimean museums can
make to prove ownership of the objects. Part I establishes several elements key to the subsequent
discussion, including the political and historical background of this dispute, the relevant laws
on a national and international level, and the role of ethics and morality in the field of cultural
heritage laws generally. Part II will consider relevant cultural heritage case studies, including
treaties that divided cultural property after countries broke apart, the Thailand-Cambodian border
dispute and the temple of Preah Vihear, and cases involving Soviet nationalized art. Past case
studies can provide examples of how countries solved cultural heritage disputes that contained
similar elements to this Ukraine-Crimea dispute. Finally, Part III analyzes the legal arguments
that are available to both Ukraine and the Crimean museums within the context of the Ukrainian
laws, international conventions, and case studies discussed in Parts I and II. This Note argues that
although the artifacts should be returned to the Crimean museums for moral reasons, the law as it
stands does not support this position.
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INTRODUCTION 
The current political conflict in Ukraine has caused an unusual 
cultural heritage problem that has been difficult to solve both legally 
and diplomatically.1 In February 2014, the Allard Pierson Museum in 
the Netherlands premiered an exhibit called “Crimea: Gold and 
Secrets of the Black Sea.”2 The exhibit included Scythian art objects 
from five Ukrainian museums—four of which are in Crimea.3 
Ukraine had never before lent out so many Crimean treasures to an 
international exhibit.4 That same month, as a result of the Euromaidan 
revolution, Russia sent troops into Crimea, a referendum was held, 
                                                            
1. See generally Paul Sonne, Scythian Gold Caught in Ukraine Dispute ‘Crimea: Gold 
and Secrets from the Black Sea,’ Exhibit on Display in Amsterdam, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304157204579471111226424466 
(noting that the Allard Pierson Museum, which displayed the Crimean exhibit says it plans to 
return the objects according to their “legal ownership”); Benjamin Durr, ‘Cold war’ over 
Crimean Gold, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/
2014/08/war-over-crimean-gold-proxy-ukraine-russia-amersterdam-
201482392137799800.html (describing the art conflict as a proxy fight amid the ongoing crisis 
between Russia and the West); Culture Wars in Ukraine: History Lessons, ECONOMIST (Apr. 
19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21601043-conflict-ukraine-spreads-its-
museums-history-lessons [hereinafter Culture Wars] (noting that whether the gold returns to 
Crimea or to Kiev, each side will accuse the Dutch of pilfering); Toby Sterling, Dutch Doubt 
Where to Return Crimean Gold, AP (Apr. 4, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/dutch-doubt-
where-return-crimean-gold (reporting that the Allard Pierson Museum has enlisted experts 
from the University of Amsterdam and the Dutch Foreign Ministry for advice on where to 
return the cultural heritage); Lydia Epp Schmidt, Four Museums in Crimea Fear Losing 
Hundreds of Precious Artifacts, ARTNET NEWS (Mar. 28, 2014), http://news.artnet.com/in-
brief/four-museums-in-crimea-fear-losing-hundreds-of-precious-artifacts-7792 (arguing that 
the art objects are technically part of the “national state fund” of Ukraine but have long been 
held in Crimea).  
2. Sterling, supra note 1 (observing that a major theme of the exhibition is Crimea’s 
history of frequent conquests by different peoples and cultures); Sonne, supra note 1 (reporting 
that the exhibit was the largest ever modern exhibit of Crimea’s ancient treasures abroad). 
3. Schmidt, supra note 1 (reporting that curators from the Crimean museums are worried 
they will never get the items back); Sterling, supra note 1 (same).  
4. Culture Wars, supra note 1 (reporting that the exhibit included a Scythian gold helmet 
from 400 BC, pottery from Greek colonizers and a lacquered Chinese box that came along the 
Silk Road); Dutch Museum Caught in Fallout from Crimea Conflict, IRISH TIMES, (Mar. 29, 
2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/dutch-museum-caught-in-fallout-from-
crimea-conflict-1.1742176 (quoting the Allard Pierson Museum as saying that the exhibit cast 
new light on the Scythians, Goths and Huns, “for centuries dismissed as little more than 
barbarians”).  
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and Crimea seceded from Ukraine and was annexed by Russia.5 In the 
Netherlands, the exhibit was scheduled to end in May, and both 
Ukraine and Russia claimed ownership over the loaned art objects.6 
The Allard Pierson Museum found itself in a difficult political and 
legal situation, unsure of where to return the art objects in dispute.7 
The museum decided to hold onto the art until a legal solution could 
be found.8 On November 19, 2014, the four Crimean museums filed a 
lawsuit in Amsterdam against the Allard Pierson Museum, claiming 
that the art objects should be returned to the institutions with the 
strongest cultural heritage ties.9  
The main legal issue in this dispute will be proving rightful 
ownership.10 Ukraine claims to be the rightful owners of the cultural 
heritage artifacts because the Ministry of Culture signed the contracts 
                                                            
5. Sonne, supra note 1 (explaining that after the museums loaned the art objects to the 
Allard Pierson museum in the Netherlands, Ukraine underwent political protests and a change 
in government; Russia sent troops into Crimea; Crimea held a referendum to secede from 
Ukraine and join Russia; and Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014); Durr, supra note 1 
(same). For a definition of “Euromaidan,” see infra note 37 and accompanying text.  
6. Durr, supra note 1 (noting that the art conflict further complicates Netherlands 
relationship with Russia); Allard Pierson Museum Holding Artifacts Claimed by Both Russia 
and Ukraine, COMMITTEE FOR CULTURAL POLICY, (Aug. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Allard 
Pierson Museum] http://committeeforculturalpolicy.org/allard-pierson-museum-holding-
artifacts-claimed-by-both-russia-and-ukraine/.  
7. See generally Sonne, supra note 1 (quoting the Allard Pierson Museum saying that it 
plans to return the objects according to their “legal ownership); Culture Wars, supra note 1 
(observing that whether the gold returns to Crimea or to Kiev, each side will accuse the Dutch 
of pilfering); Irvina Matviyishyn, Should Loaned Treasures go to Kyiv or Crimea, KYIVPOST 
(Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.kyivpost.com/content/kyiv/should-loaned-treasures-go-to-kyiv-or-
crimea-367543.html (same). 
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (referring to the Allard Pierson museum’s 
decision to keep the objects until a legal or diplomatic solution was found).  
9. Henri Neuendorf, Crimean Gold Dispute Culminates in Lawsuit, ARTNET NEWS 
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://news.artnet.com/in-brief/crimean-gold-dispute-culminates-in-lawsuit-
183777 (adding that “the objects on display must be returned to where they were discovered 
and where they were preserved . . . . and that is the museums of Crimea.”); Crimean Museums 
File Lawsuit Over Scythian Gold Collection, SPUTNIK NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013), 
http://sputniknews.com/society/20141126/1015190459.html (reporting that the four Crimean 
museums consist of the Central Tavrida Museum, the Kerch Historical and Cultural Preserve, 
the Bakhchisarai Historical and Cultural Preserve and the Tauric Chersonese National 
Preserve). Negotiations may still be underway to arrive at an out-of-court agreement, but as of 
February 2015, the parties could not reach a solution. Id.  
10. Culture Wars, supra note 1(describing the complexity of the dispute where the 
Netherlands does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea but the Allard Pierson Museum 
signed loan agreements with both the Ukrainian government and the individual Crimean 
museums); Sonne, supra note 1 (same). 
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with the Allard Pierson Museum and approved the exhibit abroad.11 
Ukraine’s Culture Minister labeled the situation “of national security 
for the Ukrainian government’s cultural possessions.”12 The Allard 
Pierson Museum, however, also signed contracts with the individual 
Crimean museums, which are now part of the Russian Federation.13 
The Museum seems to have a duty to Ukraine and the Crimean 
museums.14 The legal situation is further complicated because the 
majority of the world and the United Nations do not recognize 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea.15  
Arguments regarding where the art objects should be returned go 
to both extremes. For example, Inge van der Vlies, a professor at the 
University of Amsterdam, argues that there is an ethical case for 
returning the objects to Crimea.16 However, because the Dutch 
government does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it 
cannot return the objects to the Crimean museums due to its legal and 
political obligations to Ukraine.17  
This Note analyzes respective legal arguments that Ukraine and 
the Crimean museums can make to prove ownership of the objects. 
Part I establishes several elements key to the subsequent discussion, 
including the political and historical background of this dispute, the 
relevant laws on a national and international level, and the role of 
                                                            
11. Durr, supra note 1 (reporting that according to Ukraine, returning the art objects to 
Crimea would mean that they end up in Russian hands); Culture Wars, supra note 1 (same). 
Unfortunately, this Note will not be able to analyze any loan agreements made between the 
parties in this dispute. No legal documents have been made public as of May, 2015. 
12. Sonne, supra note 1 (arguing that the items belong to Ukraine rather than Russia).  
13. Durr, supra note 1 (determining that the contracts with the museums are the basis to 
determine where the gold has to be returned); Culture Wars, supra note 1(same). 
14. Culture Wars, supra note 1 (contemplating rightful ownership as the Allard Pierson 
Museum has signed loan agreements with both the Ukrainian government and the individual 
Crimean museums); Durr, supra note 1 (same).  
15. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, G.A. Res. 68 A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Apr. 1, 
2014). The Resolution states: 
Calls upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to 
recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 
the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to 
refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such 
altered status. 
Id. 
16. Culture Wars, supra note 1 (noting that there is no guarantee that Russia will not 
take the art pieces as soon as they arrive back to Crimea). 
17. Neuendorf, supra note 9 (showing that the Allard Pierson Museum agreed to “abide 
by a ruling by a qualified judge or arbitrator, or further agreement between the parties”); Durr, 
supra, note 1 (explaining that this art conflict is just an example of a bigger “cold conflict” 
between Russia, Ukraine and the West).  
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ethics and morality in the field of cultural heritage laws generally. 
Part II will consider relevant cultural heritage case studies, including 
treaties that divided cultural property after countries broke apart, the 
Thailand-Cambodian border dispute and the temple of Preah Vihear, 
and cases involving Soviet nationalized art. Past case studies can 
provide examples of how countries solved cultural heritage disputes 
that contained similar elements to this Ukraine-Crimea dispute. 
Finally, Part III analyzes the legal arguments that are available to both 
Ukraine and the Crimean museums within the context of the 
Ukrainian laws, international conventions, and case studies discussed 
in Parts I and II. This Note argues that although the artifacts should be 
returned to the Crimean museums for moral reasons, the law as it 
stands does not support this position.  
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE CRIMEA DISPUTE AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE LAWS 
INVOLVED IN THIS CONFLICT 
Part I discusses the historical background to the current conflict, 
as well as the laws and international treaties that could come into 
question as the Amsterdam court tries to solve the dispute between 
Ukraine and the museums in Crimea. Part I.A briefly outlines the 
history of Crimea and its relationship with Ukraine and Russia, the 
revolution in Ukraine that led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and 
the ensuing cultural heritage dispute. Part I.B introduces the 
international treaties and the cultural heritage laws relevant to the 
dispute. Part I.C considers the role morality plays in cultural heritage 
law.  
A. Factual Background  
1. Relevant History of Crimea 
Understanding the political and territorial history of Crimea 
sheds light on the complications of this dispute.18 Crimea has been 
colonized, invaded, and settled by many groups since the beginning of 
its history, including by the ancient Greeks, groups of Eurasian 
nomads called the Scythians, Turkic speaking Tatars, and the 
                                                            
18. This Note will only succinctly outline the moments in Crimea’s history as it goes 
back and forth between nations. The Author acknowledges that Crimea’s history is much more 
intricate and complex.  
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Ottomans.19 Catherine the Great of Imperial Russia defeated the 
Ottomans and formally annexed Crimea in 1783.20 Under the USSR, 
Crimea was an autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (“SSR”) until 
1945, when it became a province of the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic.21 In 1954, Crimea became a province of the 
Ukrainian SSR.22 After the breakup of the USSR, Crimea became part 
of Ukraine as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol 
City.23 During the 1990s, Crimea had a contentious relationship with 
Ukraine: during that time period Crimea issued declarations of 
independence, referendums, and Crimean constitutions.24 Since the 
breakup of the USSR, Ukraine has been split ethnically, linguistically, 
and politically, into two—the Ukrainian speaking, European-leaning 
western half and the Russian speaking, Kremlin-leaning eastern 
half.25 This situation often set ethnic Ukrainians against ethnic 
                                                            
19. Doris Wydra, The Crimea Conundrum: The Tug of War Between Russia and Ukraine 
on the Questions of Autonomy and Self Determination, 10 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 
111, 112 (2003) (“The peninsula has always been a homeland for numerous peoples, such as 
the Scythians, the Greeks and the Tatars.”); Facts You Need To Know About Crimea And Why 
it is in Turmoil, RT NEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), http://rt.com/news/crimea-facts-protests-politics-
945/ (describing how the Crimean peninsula has been colonized and conquered by historic 
empires and nomadic tribes).  
20. M. S. Anderson, The Great Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-
4, 37 THE SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 17, 18 (1958); ALAN W. FISHER, THE RUSSIAN 
ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA, 1772-1783, 135 (1970) (detailing that in April 1783, Catherine 
the Great signed a manifesto declaring the annexation of Crimea by Russia).  
21. See Wydra, supra note 19 at 113 (linking the transfer to the mass deportation of 
Tatars mainly to Uzbekistan in 1944); GWENDOLYN SASSE, THE CRIMEA QUESTION: 
IDENTITY, TRANSITION, AND CONFLICT, 95 (1972) (noting that Crimea became an oblast 
within the Russian SFSR on June 30, 1945).  
22. See Sasse, supra note 21, at 95 (clarifying that the transfer of Crimea was seen as a 
“gift” to the Ukrainian SSR to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty, 
when Ukraine unified with Russia in 1654); Wydra, supra note 19, at 113 (same).  
23. See Wydra, supra note 19, at 115 (referring to November 1990 treaty between 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the CIS Agreement); Adam Taylor, To Understand 
Crimea, Take a Look Back at its Complicated History, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-
a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/ (noting that when Ukraine held a referendum on 
independence in December 1991, 54% of Crimean voters favored independence from Russia). 
24. See Wydra, supra note 19, at 114-20 (discussing the various ways that Crimea has 
tried to gain independence after the breakup of the Soviet Union and its contentious 
relationship with Ukraine); Alessandra Stanley, Crimea Is Waging a War of Nerves With 
Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, (May 30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/30/world/crimea-is-
waging-a-war-of-nerves-with-ukraine.html (describing Crimea’s attempt to gain independence 
from Ukraine in the early 1990s).  
25. See Max Biedermann, Ukraine: Between Scylla and Charybdis, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 230 (discussing Ukrainians’ political differences while exploring the implications 
that joining either the European Union or the Eurasian Customs Union will have for Ukraine); 
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Russians in deciding elections and in shaping Ukraine’s relationship 
with Russia and the European Union.26 In 1997, Russia signed a 
“friendship treaty” with Ukraine that allowed Russia to keep its 
military bases and naval fleet in Crimea in exchange for forgiving 
Ukraine’s debt to Russia.27 Russia has continued to view its presence 
in Crimea as an important defensive assurance against the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) expansion.28 Russia, 
Ukraine, and Crimea have a long interconnected history that colors 
contemporary regional politics and culture in ways that complicate 
the legal dispute discussed in this Note.  
2. Description of the Current Political Crisis 
The current political crisis in Ukraine began in November 2013 
when President Yanukovych abandoned the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (“DCFTA”) agreement that would have significantly 
expanded economic ties between the European Union and Ukraine.29 
Instead of strengthening ties with the European Union, President 
                                                                                                                                     
R.L.G., Johnson: Is There a Single Ukraine?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2014/02/linguistic-divides (commenting that the 
west and north are predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, while the east and south are primarily 
Russian speaking).  
26. See Biedermann, supra note 25, at 230 (referring to the current conflict in Ukraine as 
former President Yanukovych was elected by a majority of votes from the pro-Russian 
population in the east while the current President Petro Poroshenko is a “pro-European 
billionaire” who won with low voter turnout, especially among the pro-Russian voters in the 
eastern half of Ukraine); R.L.G., supra note 25 (asking if modern Ukraine is truly one nation).  
27. Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Partnership, Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N. Doc. A/52/174 (“The agreements that have been 
signed create conditions for the normal operation of the Russian Black Sea fleet and its lease 
of the main base in Sevastopol for 20 years. The agreements will help strengthen security and 
stability in the region.”). 
28. Michael Specter, Setting Past Aside, Russia and Ukraine Sign Friendship Treaty, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/01/world/setting-past-aside-
russia-and-ukraine-sign-friendship-treaty.html (arguing that Russia signed the friendship treaty 
with Ukraine to bolster its defenses in the wake of NATO expansion eastward); John J. 
Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That 
Provoked Putin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault (noting that “since the 
mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, 
they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important 
neighbor turned into a Western bastion”). 
29. Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-26248275 (claiming that Ukaine chose to seek closer ties with Russia 
instead); Mearsheimer, supra note 28 (describing the economic agreement as “triple package 
of policies” which included NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion).  
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Yanukovych signed an agreement with Russia, which included terms 
such as lowered gas prices and US$15 billion in investments.30 
Competing theories exist as to why Yanukovych declined the deal.31 
Some political commentators argue that Yanukovych was using the 
prospect of the DCFTA as leverage to get a better agreement from the 
Russians.32 Other commentators say that the European Union should 
not have insisted that Yulia Timoshenko, a former prime minister and 
Yanukovych’s political rival, be freed from jail.33 Some 
commentators further say that the deal should have included a 
provision for Ukraine’s eventual membership into the European 
Union.34 Another theory is that the partnership between Ukraine and 
the European Union was misconceived by Russia as a gateway for 
NATO’s influence to reach further into Eastern Europe.35 After the 
deal with the European Union fell through, thousands of Ukrainians 
began to protest in Kiev against President Yanukovych and the 
                                                            
30. Damien McElroy, Ukraine Receives Half Price Gas and $15 Billion to Stick with 
Russia, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news (critiquing the deal as 
coming at the expense of closer ties with the European Union); Daryna Krasnolutska, Olga 
Tanas & Ilya Arkhipov, Ukraine Getting $15 Billion From Russia Raises Questions, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-17/russia-
commits-15-billion-to-ukraine-bonds-as-gas-price-reduced (questioning Yanukovych’s 
motives). 
31. Keep the Door Open, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
europe/21595957-how-europe-nearly-lost-ukrainebut-may-yet-regain-it-keep-door-open 
(describing the situation as a bidding war with Russia); Biedermann, supra note 25 
(considering the varying theories on why Yanukovych did not sign the deal with the European 
Union).  
32. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (asserting that Yanukovych played the European 
Union like fools); Putin’s Gambit: How the EU Lost Ukraine, SPIEGEL ONLINE, (Nov. 15, 
2013), [hereinafter Putin’s Gambit] http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/how-the-eu-
lost-to-russia-in-negotiations-over-ukraine-trade-deal-a-935476.html (stating that Yanukovych 
kept all options open until the end, so as to get the best possible deal).  
33. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (clarifying that Timoshenko was jailed by 
Yanukovych himself); Putin’s Gambit, supra note 32 (noting that Yanukovych was unwilling 
to release his former rival, and the parliament in Kiev failed to approve a bill that would have 
secured her release). 
34. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (arguing that the deal failed because it lacked 
membership into the European Union); Hilary Appel, EU Accession and the Ukraine Crisis, 
OPEN DEMOCRACY (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/hilary-
appel/eu-accession-and-ukraine-crisis (“The EU’s unwillingness to offer a membership 
prospect has often been lost in the vast coverage of recent events.”). 
35. Keep the Door Open, supra note 31 (blaming the failure of the European Union deal 
on NATO expansion); Mearsheimer, supra note 28 (arguing that in the eyes of Russian 
leaders, “EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion”).  
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Ukrainian government.36 The demonstrations turned violent, with 
clashes between the “Euromaidan” protesters and the police.37 On 
February 21, 2014, Yanukovych signed a European-brokered deal 
with the leaders of the protest movement, who called for new 
presidential elections at the end of the year.38 Despite the agreement, 
protests continued because many demanded Yanukovych’s immediate 
resignation.39 Yanukovych eventually fled Kiev, with the protesters 
taking over the government buildings.40  
In February, Russia sent troops in military uniforms but without 
any labels or insignia into Crimea and took over the airport and 
government buildings.41 A referendum was held in Crimea on March 
16, 2014 to rejoin Russia or return to the 1992 Constitution.42 Crimea 
                                                            
36. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (reporting that 100,000 people attended a 
demonstration in Kiev); Oksana Grytenko, Ukrainian Protesters Flood Kiev After President 
Pulls out of EU Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia (same).  
37. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (reporting that the clashes between protestors and 
police became more violent after the Ukrainian parliament passed anti-protest laws that were 
later repealed). The movement gets the name Euromaidan because the protestors began in 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (“Independence Square”) in Kiev. See Jim Heintz, Ukraine’s 
Euromaidan: What’s in a Name?, YAHOO! NEWS (Dec. 2, 2013, 4:49 AM) 
http://news.yahoo.com/ukraines-euromaidan-whats-name-090717845.html. 
38. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (noting that the deal soon became redundant); Why is 
Ukraine in turmoil? BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
25182823 (explaining that the clashes between protestors and police became more violent after 
the Ukrainian parliament passed anti-protest laws that were later repealed). 
39. Why is Ukraine in Turmoil?, supra note 38 (reporting that protestors became angry 
over amnesty for imprisoned protestors); Andrew Higgins & Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine has 
Deal, but both Russia and Protestors are Wary, NY TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0 (describing the 
unsatisfaction of protestors).  
40. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (commenting that Protesters took control of 
presidential administration buildings); Sam Frizell, Ukraine Protestors Seize Kiev as President 
Flees, TIME (Feb. 22, 2014), http://world.time.com/2014/02/22/ukraines-president-flees-
protestors-capture-kiev/ (describing how President Viktor Yanukovych fled Kiev just hours 
after signing a European Union-sponsored peace deal).  
41. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (characterizing the troops as unidentified gunmen); 
Mark Mackinnon, Globe in Ukraine: Russian-backed Fighters Restrict Access to Crimean 
City, GLOBE & MAIL, (last updated May. 12 2014, 12:35 PM) http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tension-in-crimea-as-pro-russia-and-pro-ukraine-
groups-stage-competing-rallies/article17110382/#dashboard/follows/?cmpId=tgc (same); Putin 
Admits Russian Forces were Deployed to Crimea, REUTERS, (Apr 17, 2014 9:51 AM BST) 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/russia-putin-crimea-IdUKL6N0N921H20140417 
(reporting on Putin’s admission of deployment of troops in Crimea). 
42. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (specifying that the referendum vote was considered a 
sham by the West); Crimea referendum: Voters Back Russia Union, BBC (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097 (same).  
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reported that 95.5% of voters chose to rejoin Russia.43 The United 
States and the European Union maintain that the referendum was 
illegal and illegitimate.44  
Debate has ensued over the proper classification of the crisis in 
Ukraine.45 Despite the fact that there were Russian troops on 
Ukrainian territory—a fact that Vladimir Putin has admitted46—the 
international community has been reluctant to label the situation an 
international armed conflict because of the lack of “armed hostilities 
between two or more governments” during the occupation of 
Crimea.47 The International Committee of the Red Cross has 
described the events in Eastern Ukraine as a “non-international armed 
conflict.”48 US observers commented that Russian forces had 
operational control in Crimea and blockaded Ukrainian naval and 
                                                            
43. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (citing organizers of the referendum); Crimea 
Referendum, supra note 42 (same). 
44. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (reporting that The European Union and United States 
impose travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine over the 
Crimea referendum); Crimea Officially Moves to Join Russia, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/crimea-russia-20143179915762292.html 
(reporting that the European Union said the referendum was “illegal and illegitimate” and its 
outcome would not be recognized. President Barack Obama told Russian President Vladimir 
Putin that Crimea’s vote to secede from Ukraine and join Russia “would never be recognized” 
by the United States). 
45. Andrew Higgins, On Ukraine, the West Sidesteps a Fraught Term, NY TIMES (Sept. 
4, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/world/europe/in-west-fine-line-on-labeling-
ukraine-crisis.html?_r=0 (contemplating that calling the situation in Ukraine an invasion will 
put pressure on the United States to intervene militarily); Mark Gollom, Ukraine crisis: Why 
the U.S. Avoids Calling Russia’s Actions an ‘Invasion,’ CBS, (Sept. 1, 2014), http://
www.cbc.ca/news/world/ukraine-crisis-why-the-u-s-avoIds-calling-russia-s-actions-an-
invasion-1.2750469 (discussing why The United States avoids calling Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine an invasion). 
46. Brett Logiurato, Putin Finally Admits to Sending Troops to Crimea, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/putin-admits-troops-crimea-2014-
4#ixzz3bJ0vi1uI (emphasizing that this is the first time that Putin has admitted such 
involvement by Russia in Ukraine); Putin Admits Russian Forces Were Deployed in Crimea, 
supra note 41 (same).  
47. Eastern Ukraine: Questions and Answers about the Laws of War, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/11/eastern-ukraine-questions-
and-answers-about-laws-war (explaining that Russian troops in Crimea triggered the 
international law on occupation).  
48. Red Cross Admits Ukraine is in a State of Civil War, ITAR-TASS (July 23, 2014), 
http://en.itar-tass.com/world/742051 (defining events as a civil war); Tom Miles, Ukraine War 
Crimes Trials: A Step Closer After Red Cross Assessment, REUTERS (Jul. 22, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/22/us-ukraine-crisis-warcrimes-
IDUSKBN0FR0V920140722 (same).  
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military access.49 Additionally, while Russian forces were in Crimea 
prior to the referendum vote, the forces oversaw the disarming of 
military installations in the area and begun issuing new naturalization 
documents to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea.50 Such actions indicated 
that Russian forces exercised actual authority in Crimea.51 The back-
and-forth nature of Crimea’s territorial history with Russia and 
Ukraine is important to understanding the current political crisis in 
Ukraine and why Russia wanted to quickly secure the area after 
Ukraine chose a pro-European Union government.52  
3. Discussion of the Cultural Heritage Conflict 
Once the news broke that both the Crimean museums and the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Culture requested the loaned art objects from 
the Allard Pierson Museum, the Crimean museums issued a press 
release explaining why the objects should be returned to them.53 They 
explained that the objects in the dispute can be traced back a thousand 
years B.C. to civilizations that lived on the Crimean Peninsula.54 
Moreover, the items always have been kept and studied on the 
                                                            
49. Zoe Niesel, Collateral Damage: Protecting Cultural Heritage in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine, THE COMMON L., WAKE FOREST L. REV., (2014), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/
2014/08/collateral-damage-protecting-cultural-heritage-in-crimea-and-eastern-ukraine/ 
(arguing that the situation in Crimea should be labled an occupation); Marie-Louise 
Gumuchian et al., Ukraine Mobilizes Troops After Russia’s “Declaration of War”, CNN (Mar. 
3, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-politics/ (same).  
50. See Niesel, supra note 49 (indicating that Russian troops have actual authority in 
Crimea); Natalia Antelava, The Creeping Annexation of Crimea, NEW YORKER (Mar. 5, 
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/03/the-creeping-annexation-
of-crimea.html (outlining the events before the referendum). 
51. See Niesel, supra note 50 (refering to the troops blockading Ukrainian naval and 
military access); Antelava, supra note 51 (citing the troops’ control of the government 
buildings).  
52. See generally Mark Kramer, Why Russia Intervenes, PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND 
SECURITY, August 2014, http://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/russia-intervenes/ 
(analyzing theories on why Russia intervened after the Euromaidan revolution); Mearsheimer, 
supra note 28 (contending that Crimea also made for an easy target because ethnic Russians 
compose roughly 60 percent of its population); Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich & John 
J. Mearsheimer, Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
(Nov./Dec. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142260/michael-mcfaul-stephen-
sestanovich-john-j-mearsheimer/faulty-powers (challenging Mearsheimer’s argument that 
Russia has annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine in response to NATO 
expansion).  
53. See Press Release, Statement Made by the Crimean Musea Regarding the Exhibition 
Crimea. The Golden Island in the Black Sea, (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.kerch-museum.com/
ru/news/press-reliz0.html (declaring the Crimean museums as legal owners of the art objects).  
54. Id. (emphasizing Crimea’s particular history).  
1272 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1261 
territory where they were found by the Crimean museums.55 The 
museums consider the art objects to be the cultural heritage of 
Crimea.56  
The Crimean Peninsula itself belonged to different states over the 
last one hundred years . . . . No matter to what state the Crimean 
Peninsula has belonged, the Crimean archeological findings have 
always been safeguarded and studied solely by the Crimean 
Musea . . . . The loss of archeological findings will impoverish 
the collection . . . . The loss of these exhibits means for us both 
the loss of items of world importance and the loss of 
archeological heritage constituting the core of the cultural code 
of our people.57  
There is an enormous potential for loss, both cultural and 
financial, should the objects not be returned to the Crimean 
museums.58 For example, the Tavrida Central Museum in the city of 
Simferopol loaned 132 artifacts, with an insured value of 
US$217,000, to the Allard Pierson Museum.59 Andrey Malgin, the 
museum's director, explained that, as is customary with loan 
collections, the museum has concluded a contract with the Allard 
Pierson Museum with the condition that the artifacts must be returned 
to the museum.60 The items, however, are property of both the 
museum and the State, he said.61 Commenting on the lawsuit, Malgin 
maintained that the objects must return to the place where they were 
discovered and preserved, which is the museum in Crimea.62 Also, the 
integrity of a collection frequently is put forward as a reason for the 
repatriation of cultural heritage.63 Integrity of a collection usually is 
                                                            
55. Id. (invoking the preservation of information argument). 
56. Id. (describing the museums as unique research centers employing real experts in the 
Crimean ancient history).  
57. Id. (emphasizing the tie between the art objects and the Crimean people).  
58. Durr, supra note 1 (referencing the above Tavrida Central Museum example); Allard 
Pierson Museum, supra note 6 (same).  
59. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
60. Durr, supra note 1 (arguing that “museum property is primary and more fundamental 
than the property of the state.”).  
61. Id. 
62. Neuendorf, supra note 9 (discussing the lawsuit filed by the Crimean Museums in 
the Dutch court).  
63. See BEAT SCHÖNENBERGER, THE RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL ASSETS: CAUSES OF 
ACTION, OBSTACLES TO RESTITUTION, DEVELOPMENTS 49-50 (2009) (discussing how the 
integrity of an object can be used for or against restitution); IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION: A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW 252 (2011) (same).  
2015] WHO OWNS THE SCYTHIAN GOLD? 1273 
cited when the value of a piece is dependent on cross-referencing with 
other items in the collection.64 Furthermore, keeping a collection 
together is important for academic research and documentation as the 
items can be studied together and referenced to demonstrate how the 
collection was put together.65  
However, the loan agreements—as they have been portrayed in 
the news seem to favor Ukraine.66 Larisa Sedikova, deputy director of 
the Crimean museum Chersonesos, an ancient Greek city and a 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”) heritage site in Sevastopol, stated that the contract for 
the exhibition stipulates that the objects should return to Ukraine in 
the event of a force majeure.67 "But we do not consider this a force 
majeure," she stated, noting that Chersonesos faces no threat of 
damage.68 Rather, Ukraine and UNESCO are mostly worried that 
Russia plans on taking cultural heritage located in the Crimea and 
moving them to State museums in Moscow and St. Petersburg.69 They 
have warned Russia to safeguard “Ukraine’s” cultural heritage.70 The 
Russian State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg even issued a 
statement on the matter:  
In the light of reports in a number of mass media on the alleged 
willingness of Russians museum directorates to take hold of the 
Crimean arts values that are currently exhibited in Europe, the 
State Hermitage Museum would like to make it clear that the 
concern the Association of Russian Museums and the Hermitage 
experts have expressed over the destiny of treasures from the 
Crimean museums does not mean in any way that either the State 
                                                            
64. SCHÖNENBERGER supra note 63, at 49-50 (clarifying that this facilitates educational 
research); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 252 n.121 (asserting that the whole of the object 
and its cultural environment is better than the part). 
65. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 49-50 (arguing that the integrity of a collection 
may be imperative for the future academic research); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 29 
(same).  
66. Durr, supra note 1 (arguing that the Allard Pierson Museum has to fulfill its 
obligations vis-a-vis Ukraine first and foremost); Culture Wars, supra note 1 (same). 
67. Sonne, supra note 1 (quoting Ms. Sedikova as saying “It’s important that [the art 
items] are not stolen from us"). 
68. Id. 
69. Follow up by UNESCO of the Situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
U.N. Doc. 194 EX/32 (Apr. 3, 2014), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/
0022/002272/227294e.pdf (noting that the “reported massive transfer of priceless cultural 
objects from Crimean museums to the Russian capital is alarming”).  
70. Id. (reminding Russia of its obligations under international cultural heritage law).  
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Hermitage Museum or any other Russian museums have claims 
to the Crimean museum collections.71 
Notably, Russia appears to be making efforts to work with the 
Crimean museums and archeologists to stop the smuggling of cultural 
heritage artifacts from ancient sites.72 Consequently, the Crimean 
museums could point to the unstable situation in Ukraine to argue that 
the art objects would be safer and better preserved in Crimea with the 
support of Russia.73 While the political and cultural history of the area 
is important to understanding why this dispute came about, the 
international treaties and domestic cultural heritage laws are 
important in considering how this dispute may be resolved.  
B. Legal Underpinnings  
Depending on the scope of the given convention, international 
cultural heritage treaties can be applied to both inter-state and private 
disputes, or even just to consider the general principles derived 
therein.74 The international conventions have been important to the 
repatriation of cultural heritage objects because they provide a 
consistent and coherent framework to deal with the disputes.75 Even if 
                                                            
71. Dutch Foreign Ministry is in Two Minds about Crimean Scythian Gold, TASS (Apr. 
3, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/world/726513 (quoting a statement from the State Hermitage 
museum). 
72. See Sophia Kishkovsky, Crimea’s Looted Treasure on the Political Agenda, THE 
ART NEWSPAPER (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Crimeas-looted-
treasure-on-the-political-agenda/32394 (describing the efforts Russia is taking to deal with 
looting of art objects in Crimea); see also, Kakie kul’turnye ob’ekty poterjaet Ukraina vmeste s 
Krymom (What cultural objects will Ukraine lose with the Crimea), THE INSIDER (Mar. 25, 
2014), http://www.theinsider.ua/rus/art/kakie-kulturnye-obekty-poteryaet-ukraina-vmeste-s-
krymom (discussing how museum directors in Crimea feel about working with the Russian 
Ministry of Culture and the uncertain future of the cultural heritage located in Crimea).  
73. Mark Mackinnon, Ukrainian Staff Working Unpaid in History Museum to Preserve 
Culture, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/ukrainian-
staff-working-unpaid-in-history-museum-to-preserve-culture/article21504462/ (interviewing 
museum workers on their opinions about dealing with Russia instead of Ukraine). Russia has 
emphasized their dedication to preserving the cultural heritage in Ukraine while besmirching 
Ukraine’s lack of support to the cause. “During the last decade, the Ministry of Culture of 
Ukraine . . . allocated no funds to the implementation of Reserve functions, including the 
preservation of cultural heritage. Moreover, the Ukrainian Government adopted no programs 
for the development of the Reserve.” U.N. Doc. 194 EX/32, supra note 69.  
74. STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 189 (clarifying that cultural property claims are 
usually international claims); cf. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 56 (noting that legal 
instruments not based in private law can also facilitate the restitution of cultural assets).  
75. See M. Vicien-Milburn, A. Garcia Marquez & A. Fouchard Papaesfstratiou, 
UNESCO’s Role in the Restitution of Disputes on the Recovery of Cultural Property, 10 
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the Dutch court does not apply the below international conventions, it 
may refer to the internationally accepted guidelines in trying to 
resolve the art conflict.76    
1. The Hague Convention and Protocol 
The Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (“The Hague Convention”) marked the first 
time that the international community successfully drafted a 
framework to protect the world’s cultural property.77 Following the 
devastating impact of World War II on cultural heritage, The Hague 
Convention reconvened in 1954 for the purpose of reestablishing 
principles for the protection of cultural property during an armed 
conflict.78  
The Hague Convention applies to “partial or total occupation of 
the territory” of a Member State, even if there is “no armed 
resistance.”79 The signing parties “undertake to prohibit, prevent and, 
if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or 
misappropriation of, and any act of vandalism directed against, 
cultural property” in time of war.80 A country that occupies a Member 
State’s territory, wholly or in part, is obliged to assist the occupied 
                                                                                                                                     
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 2 (2013) (arguing that UNESCO’s “standard-setting activity in the 
fight against the illicit traffic of cultural goods has contributed to the harmonization of the 
legal framework for disputes on the recovery of cultural property”); see also STAMATOUDI, 
supra note 63, at 178 (describing the role that international organizations have had in creating 
consensus and agreement with international conventions).  
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
77. John B. Gordon, The UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Movement of Art Treasures, 
12 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 537, 538 (1971) (citing B. HOLLANDER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
ART 24 (1959)); Gao Sheng, International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Preliminary 
Issues and the Role Of International Conventions, 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 57, 62-63 (2008) (noting that 
the Hague convention was the first time the term “cultural property” was used). 
78. See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 475 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that the United States only ratified the Hague 
Convention after the fall of the Soviet Union because it was concerned that it would be 
prevented from attacking the Kremlin, a historical monument); Gordon, supra note 77, at 538 
(noting that the convention did not apply to non-military situations and left a gap in the 
protection of cultural heritage). 
79. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240, art. 
18, ¶ 2 [hereinafter Hague Convention] (“Recognizing that cultural property has suffered grave 
damage during recent armed conflicts and that, by reason of the developments in the technique 
of warfare, it is in increasing danger of destruction . . . . ”).  
80. Id. art. 4, ¶ 3.  
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country with the protection of its own cultural patrimony.81 This 
clause is especially important to the dispute at issue, as Russia is seen 
by Ukraine as an occupying power in Crimea.82 The Hague 
Convention applies in the event of a declared war or any other armed 
conflict between two or more Member States, “even if the state of war 
is not recognized by” the countries involved.83 Again, this applies to 
the current situation as Russia does not see itself as an occupying 
party but considers Crimea completely within the Russian 
Federation.84 The annexed Protocol to the Hague Convention further 
emphasizes that each Member State has an obligation to prevent the 
exportation of cultural property from a territory under its occupation 
during an armed conflict, and to confiscate and return “cultural 
property imported into its territory either directly or indirectly from an 
occupied territory.”85  
The Hague Convention and the annexed Protocol have been 
signed and ratified by all of the parties involved in this conflict—the 
Netherlands, Russia, and Ukraine.86 Ukraine takes the position that 
Crimea is occupied by Russia and, consequently, it may argue in 
court that the 1954 Hague Convention applies.87 If the Dutch court 
decides to apply the Hague Convention, it likely will decide to return 
the objects to Ukraine instead of Crimea in order to protect the art 
objects from occupation and possible exportation into Russia.88  
                                                            
81. Id. art. 18, ¶ 1.  
82. Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII of April 15, 2014 On Securing the Rights and 
Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine 
(with changes set forth by the Law No 1237-VII of May 6, 2014) [hereinafter Ukraine’s Law 
on Occupied Crimea], available at http://mfa.gov.ua/en/news-feeds/foreign-offices-
news/23095-law-of-ukraine-no-1207-vii-of-15-april-2014-on-securing-the-rights-and-
freedoms-of-citizens-and-the-legal-regimeon-the-temporarily-occupied-territory-of-ukraine-
with-changes-set-forth-by-the-law-no-1237-vii-of-6-may-2014 (declaring that the presence of 
units and armed forces in the territory of Ukraine is an occupation of the sovereign state of 
Ukraine).  
83. Hague Convention, supra note 79, ¶ 1.  
84. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29 (referring to the referendum vote); Treaty to Accept 
Crimea, Sevastopol to Russian Federation Signed, RT NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://rt.com/
news/putin-include-crimea-sevastopol-russia-578/ (same).  
85. Hague Convention, supra note 79. 
86. See id.  
87. ICOM Ukraine, FACEBOOK, (Apr. 2, 2014) https://www.facebook.com/icom.ukraine/
posts/730118943675428 (last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (issuing a statement on the Ukraine ICOM 
Committee Facebook page stating that Ukraine has lost all access and ability to manage the 
Crimean culture heritage objects and museums).  
88. Hague Convention, supra note 79, art. 4, ¶ 3. 
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2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property (“the UNESCO Convention”) provides an 
international framework for nations to work together to stop illicit 
trafficking and promote the restitution of cultural heritage.89 The 
Convention was adopted in November 1970 by the 16th General 
Conference of UNESCO.90 It aims to attain a minimum level of 
uniform protection for cultural heritage and mutual cooperation and 
solidarity for the cause among the Member States.91  
The UNESCO Convention broadly defines cultural objects that 
Member States should protect by focusing on history, archeology, art, 
science, and literature, but allows each State to designate what 
constitutes cultural property and what should be protected.92 It also 
covers the protection of property in case of war or occupation.93 
Article 11 of the 1970 Convention states that any cultural property 
that has been exported or transferred arising directly or indirectly 
from an occupation will be considered “illicit.”94 Article 13 requires 
State parties to prevent transfers of ownership of cultural property 
likely to promote the illicit import or export of that property.95 Article 
                                                            
89. Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, at 2 (clarifying that the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
also encourages the restitution of cultural property); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 
14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, arts. 7b, 9 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention] (obliging 
Contracting Countries to prohibit the importation of cultural property stolen from a museum or 
monument in another Member State, and allows Contracting Countries whose cultural heritage 
is in danger to ask other Member States for help in protecting the affected heritage).  
90. PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON THE 
MEANS OF PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING THE ILLICIT IMPORT, EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF 
OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 1 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining that seventy-seven States 
voted in favor of adoption, one against, and eight States abstained); Gordon, supra note 77, at 
540 (commenting that as of March 10, 1971, no country had ratified or acceded to the 
convention).  
91. STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 33 (specifying that the UNESCO Convention is not 
a self-executing legal instrument); see 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, Preamable 
(“Considering that the protection of cultural heritage can be effective only if organized both 
nationally and internationally among States working in close co-operation.”).  
92. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 37 (arguing that the text of Article 1 shows that each 
State has the right to decide what is important for its own national cultural heritage); Vicien-
Milburn, supra note 75, at 2 n.19 (same); see also 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, 
art. 1.  
93. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, art. 11.  
94. See id. 
95. See id. art. 13. 
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13 also requires States to recognize the right of each signatory of the 
UNESCO Convention to declare cultural property as “inalienable” 
and to assist in the recovery of such property in cases where it has 
been illegally exported.96 The UNESCO Convention does not define 
what kinds of transfers are likely to promote illicit traffic.97 States 
can, therefore, use their own legal systems to decide how to prevent 
transfers of ownership that will promote illicit traffic.98 The text of 
Article 15 allows Member States to make bilateral agreements to deal 
with cultural heritage disputes, stating that international agreements 
already in effect are not to be disturbed by the 1970 Convention.99 
The use of diplomatic or settlement agreements is also an alternative 
way of supplementing the UNESCO Convention or other cultural 
heritage treaties by providing solutions which may be appropriate to a 
specific region or conflict but which could not be “universalized.”100  
The UNESCO Convention generally emphasizes the Nation-
State.101 It highlights the protection of the national cultural heritage of 
the country of origin.102 Russia, Ukraine, and the Netherlands have 
also signed the UNESCO Convention.103 The UNESCO Convention’s 
emphasis on the rights of Nation-States strengthens Ukraine’s 
argument because Crimea is not a Nation-State, and therefore, cannot 
                                                            
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See id. art. 15 (“Nothing in this Convention shall prevent State Parties thereto from 
concluding special agreements among themselves or from continuing to implement agreements 
already concluded regarding the restitution of cultural property removed, whatever the reason, 
from its territory of origin, before the entry into force of this Convention for the States 
concerned.”); O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 89 (noting that agreements already in existence are 
not affected by the coming into force of the 1970 UNESCO Convention).  
99. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89, art. 15; O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 
89 (clarifying that Article 15 does not permit a State to refuse to implement the 1970 
UNESCO Convention unless a bilateral agreement is signed).  
100. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 89 (explaining that bilateral agreements are 
supplementary to the Convention, but not a substitute); Gordon, supra note 77, at 552 
(exploring the treaty signed between the United States and Mexico in July, 1970 to combat the 
smuggling of colonial and pre Colombian artifacts as an example).  
101. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 846 (arguing that the 1970 UNESCO Convention emphasizes the interests of States 
in its preamble and throughout); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 216 (referencing the 
protection of the cultural heritage of the country of origin—the first principle of the 
Convention). 
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (describing the emphasis of the Nation 
State in the 1970 UNESCO Convention).  
103. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 89.  
2015] WHO OWNS THE SCYTHIAN GOLD? 1279 
claim any rights to the artifacts under the UNESCO Convention.104 
Further, the 1970 Convention lacks in that it only provides a 
framework of principles that Member States can follow in disputes, 
but does not provide any rights that Member States could raise during 
adjudications.105 It also does not deal with certain applicable issues 
including cultural heritage issues in territories that have been 
integrated into a former colonizing or occupying State, or disputes 
involving the return of cultural property from museums in the capital 
of a country that has split apart.106 UNESCO commissioned the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(“UNIDROIT”) to draft an agreement that would supplement the 
1970 Convention.107  
3. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention aimed to harmonize the laws 
of participating countries regarding claims for the return of stolen or 
illegally exported cultural property.108 Unfortunately, only a few 
countries have ratified this convention.109 Article 5 of the Convention 
states:  
A cultural object which has been temporarily exported from the 
territory of the requesting State, for purposes such as exhibition, 
research or restoration, under a permit issued according to its law 
regulating its export for the purpose of protecting its cultural 
                                                            
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (supporting Ukraine’s position in the 
dispute).  
105. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 13 (noting that the 1970 Convention has to operate 
within the framework of other laws and international treaties); Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, 
at 10 (same).  
106. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 80-81 (citing examples such as former States from 
the Soviet Union, former States of Yugoslavia, Eritrea, and Bangladesh); cf. 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, supra note 89, art. 12 (lacking language that resolves disputes between territories 
or States that have split apart from Member States).  
107. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 13 (explaining that the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
did not address private law matters like the bona fide purchaser for example); Xi Lian, A 
Contemporary Observation on International Protection of Cultural Property, 4 CONTEMP. 
READINGS L. & SOC. JUST. 855, 860 (2012) (same). 
108. See O’KEEFE, supra note 90, at 13 (arguing that the UNIDROIT Convention 
compliments the UNESCO Convention by giving individuals the right to sue directly in a 
foreign court); Lian, supra note 107, at 860 (same).  
109. See Status, UNIDROIT, available at http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2015). 
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heritage and not returned in accordance with the terms of that 
permit shall be deemed to have been illegally exported.110  
In order for its return, the requesting State must show that the 
removal of the object significantly impairs the physical preservation 
of the object, the object’s integrity, the preservation of information of 
the object, or that the object is of important cultural significance to 
the requesting State.111  
Both Ukraine and the Crimean museums could have used Article 
5 from the UNIDROIT Convention for their arguments. However, 
Ukraine has not signed the UNIDROIT Convention.112 Russia and the 
Netherlands have signed it, but neither country has ratified nor 
implemented it, making it unlikely that UNIDROIT will be used in 
this dispute. International laws and conventions created to protect and 
facilitate the return of cultural heritage are not always adequate.113 
While they can provide a framework for how cultural heritage should 
be protected and what principles should apply, they sometimes fall 
short for legal arguments.114 Many States are not parties to these 
conventions, leaving cultural heritage claims outside of the scope of 
the international framework.115  
4. National Cultural Heritage Laws 
In the Netherlands, the Cultural Property Return from Occupied 
Territory Act of 2007 (“2007 Cultural Property Act”) and the 1970 
UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property (Implementation) Act (“2009 
                                                            
110. See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 
24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322, art. 5, ¶ 2.  
111. Id. art. 5, ¶ 3.  
112. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (referencing the text of the UNIDROIT 
Convention).  
113. Marie Cornu & Marc-André Renold, New Developments in the Restitution of 
Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 17 INT’L. J. CULT. PROP. 1, 2 
(2010) (noting that French courts find legal grounds to justify the country’s refusal to adhere to 
its obligations under an international convention); Vicien-Milburn supra note 75, at 5 
(explaining that the conventions do not apply retroactively). 
114. Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, at 5 (noting that many States have not ratified the 
conventions); Cornu & Renold, supra note 113, at 2 (same). 
115. See ALESSANDRO CHECHI, PLURALITY AND COORDINATION OF DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT METHODS, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 184 
(Francesco Francioni & James Gordley eds., 2013) (observing that international conventions 
are not systematically recognized or enforced in countries); Vicien-Milburn, supra note 75, at 
5 (same).  
2015] WHO OWNS THE SCYTHIAN GOLD? 1281 
Implementation Act”) provide a legal framework for the protection of 
cultural heritage.116 By passing these acts, the Netherlands undertook 
the responsibilities of preserving its own national heritage and 
cooperating with the international community to protect the cultural 
property of the Member States to the 1970 Convention.117  
The 2007 Cultural Property Act was created to help repatriate 
cultural property that was removed from a State during an armed 
conflict.118 The Implementation Act deals with cultural goods that 
were removed from a Member States’ territory in violation of a law 
protecting its national heritage.119 It was created to coincide with the 
2007 Cultural Property Act, so that a country asking for the return of 
a cultural heritage object can begin a lawsuit in the Netherlands 
instead of having to go to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).120 
The Netherlands will respect each Member State’s definition of 
cultural heritage as long as it complies with the texts of the 
Conventions.121 Once a return proceeding is commenced, it is up to 
the authorities of the requesting State to show that the disputed 
objects are protected under its own laws.122 The Netherlands Supreme 
Court has held that, in a matter of choice of law, or in reconciling the 
laws of different legal jurisdictions, such as sovereign States, the 
                                                            
116. See generally Marja Van Hesse, The Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention in the Netherlands: A Legal and Practical Approach, 42 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 33, 
34 n.4 (2011) (explaining that the laws contain rules on the taking into custody of cultural 
property from an occupied territory during an armed conflict and for the initiation of 
proceedings for the return of such property); Cultural Property Originating from Occupied 
Territory (Return) Act) [hereinafter 2007 Cultural Property Act], available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/InternationalArtHeritageLaw/Netherlands.aspx; 1970 UNESCO 
Convention on the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
(Implementation) Act 2009 [hereinafter 2009 Implementation Act], available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/InternationalArtHeritageLaw/Netherlands.aspx.  
117. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (referring to laws passed by the 
Netherlands to implement the 1970 UNESCO Convention). 
118. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 39 (describing the differences between the two 
Netherlands acts). See generally 2007 Cultural Property Act, supra note 116. 
119. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 39 (specifying that the Act complies with the 
1970 UNESCO Convention). See generally 2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116. 
120. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 39 (reasoning that the acts were designed to work 
jointly in the situation of a cultural heritage dispute); cf. 2007 Cultural Property Act, supra 
note 116; 2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116.  
121. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 40 (noting that the Conventions purposefully 
created a broad definition of cultural heritage); cf. 2007 Cultural Property Act, supra note 116; 
2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116. 
122. See Van Hesse, supra note 116, at 40 (implying that each State will have the 
opportunity to defend its own cultural heritage because of the broadness of the definition); cf. 
2007 Cultural Property Act, supra note 116; 2009 Implementation Act, supra note 116.  
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Dutch court would apply another State’s law if it was the most 
appropriate law for the conflict.123 The law of the country where the 
issue or conflict took place will take precedence, and if the conflict 
took place in more than one country, the law of the jurisdiction with 
the closest link to the issue or conflict applies.124 As a result, Ukraine 
may argue that the Netherlands should apply its national cultural 
heritage laws created to protect the cultural heritage located within the 
territory of Ukraine because it is the State where the conflict took 
place.125 
The Law of Ukraine on Protection of Cultural Heritage states 
that archeological monuments, including movable objects, are the 
State’s property.126 The objects must be included in the Museum fund 
of Ukraine, registered with the Ministry of Culture, and preserved in 
accordance with Ukrainian legislation.127 Ukraine also has a law that 
specifically protects archeological heritage.128 The law defines 
archeological heritage as “the system of archeological monuments 
and shared territories, being under State protection, and also 
moveable cultural values (archeological items), that comes from the 
objects of the archeological heritage.”129 Article 18 of the law states 
that any objects found as a result of archeological research, movable 
and immovable objects, are State property.130 On April 15, 2014, the 
Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law “On Ensuring Protection of the 
Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and Legal Regime on the 
Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” (“Ukraine’s Law on 
Occupied Crimea”).131 The law states that the Russian Federation is 
                                                            
123. See HR, February 23, 1996, NJ 1997, 276, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_net_en.htm (illustrating that there are no statutory 
regulations in respect to applying another country’s laws).  
124. See id. (referencing the management of the affairs of another). 
125. The Law of Ukraine on Protection of Cultural Heritage, Preamble in Law version N 
2245-IV (2245-15) of December 16, 2014 [hereinafter Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Law], 
available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/ukraine/ua_law_protection_
cultural_heritage_engtof.pdf; The Law of Ukraine, On Protection of Archeological Heritage, 
VVR, 2004 [hereinafter Ukraine’s Archeological Heritage Law], available at 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/ukraine/ua_law_protection_archaelogical_h
eritage_engtof.pdf.  
126. See Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Law, supra note 125.  
127. See id.  
128. See Ukraine’s Archeological Heritage Law, supra note 125.  
129. See id.  
130. See id.  
131. See Ukraine’s Law on Occupied Crimea, supra note 82; Olexander Martinenko et 
al., Ukraine Creates a Special Legal Regime in the Crimea, KYIV POST (May 6, 2014), 
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liable for any damage caused in connection with the military 
intervention in the Crimea, including to legal entities, persona, and 
cultural heritage located in the Crimean territory.132 
According to Ukraine’s cultural heritage laws, cultural heritage 
and archeological objects located in Ukraine are, first and foremost, 
State property.133 Moreover, by passing the Law on Occupied Crimea, 
Ukraine has officially indicated that it considers Crimea to be 
temporarily occupied rather than permanently annexed, and will hold 
Russia responsible for any damage to Ukraine’s cultural heritage.134 
In court, Ukraine may use national laws such as the Law on Occupied 
Crimea to argue that the art objects in dispute are actually Ukrainian 
cultural heritage and should be kept out of occupying forces’ hands.135  
C. How Ethics and Morals Fit Into the Discussion 
Ethics and morality play a strong role in cultural heritage law 
and preservation.136 Cultural heritage preservation laws were passed 
internationally and by States because there is a mutual interest in the 
information and enjoyment of cultural artifacts.137 The public interest 
is served by the preservation, protection, and study of cultural objects; 
and the damage, distortion, and suppression of cultural heritage are 
unethical.138 Morality plays a strong role in the argument of cultural 
nationalism and the idea that objects should be returned to their 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/company-news/ukraine-creates-a-special-legal-regime-in-
the-crimea-346501.html (outlining the Law on Occupied Crimea).  
132. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.  
133. See Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Law, supra note 125.  
134. See Ukraine’s Law on Occupied Crimea, supra note 82. 
135. See Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage Laws, supra note 125; see Ukraine’s Law on 
Occupied Crimea, supra note 82.  
136. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, “CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS” 
THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES, CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART 
AND LAW 286 (defining ethics to mean action according to moral principles). Cf. CHECHI, 
supra note 115, at 203 (describing international public policy as a set of principles that can 
overcome rules and agreements because of broad consensus). 
137. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 287 (assuming that readers 
agree with this proposition); cf. CHECHI, supra note 115, at 203 (arguing that international 
public policy was promulgated under the creation of the international cultural heritage 
conventions).  
138. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 287 (arguing that this self- 
interest expresses an ethical principle that should bind others); see also The 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, supra note 89, Preamble (“Considering that the interchange of cultural property 
among nations for scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the knowledge of the 
civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and 
appreciation among nations.”). 
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countries of origin because such objects are national icons, are 
necessary for collections that are representative of a culture, or are 
essential to the rituals or beliefs of current cultures.139 
There are also object-centered ethical concerns.140 An object’s 
integrity, preservation, or information could be at the center for the 
moral argument to repatriate it, or, on the other hand, could limit its 
movement.141 This art dispute is right at the center of the two ethical 
frameworks. The Crimean museums have made the argument that it is 
essential to return the objects to Crimea for the objects’ and 
collections’ integrity and informational preservation.142 Ukraine, 
however, argues that this dispute is simply part of the larger question 
of Ukraine’s State sovereignty and cultural independence.143 
II. CASE STUDIES OF PAST CULTURAL HERITAGE DISPUTES  
Cultural heritage disputes in the past can demonstrate principles 
and trends that courts have emphasized or upheld and could apply to 
the current dispute. Part II considers international treaties that 
included the division of objects of cultural heritage before the 
emergence of international cultural heritage conventions. Next, Part II 
examines the situation with the Preah Vihear temple in Southeast Asia 
and how a cultural heritage dispute was decided “legally” but did not 
resolve the issues involved. Finally, Part II reviews two cases that 
involved the Soviet Union’s nationalization decrees of art and how 
other countries chose to recognize and uphold the laws.  
                                                            
139. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 294 (creating the elements of 
an ethical decision structure). See generally Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 
supra note 101 (explaining the difference between the theories of cultural nationalism and 
internationalism in the context of cultural heritage).  
140. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 291 (arguing that aside from 
cultural nationalism, object centered concerns may create questions of ethics); see also The 
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 110, art. 5, ¶ 3 (recognizing the importance of the 
preservation and integrity of the art object in dispute).  
141. See CULTURAL PROPERTY ETHICS, supra note 136, at 291 (asking if some objects 
may be too fragile or delicate that movement exposes them to unacceptable risk); 
STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 252 (arguing that cultural law should be applied with the 
preservation and integrity of the art object in mind).  
142. See Press Release, supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
143. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (referencing the argument for returning 
the disputed art objects to Ukraine).  
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A. Treaties Dividing Cultural Heritage 
Before the formation of UNESCO and the protection of cultural 
heritage conventions, many cultural heritage disputes were solved 
diplomatically and usually involved political compromises.144 Peace 
treaties were used to distribute the cultural heritage objects after the 
dissolution of multi-national States in Europe.145 However, there are 
conceptual similarities between the peace treaties and what was later 
adopted by the conventions, including the importance of State 
ownership and territorial ties to the objects in dispute.146 
The issue of repatriation of cultural property on a large scale was 
first addressed in the unification of Italy.147 The Austro-Hungarian 
Empire ceded the city of Venice, and the Austro-Italian Treaty of 
1866 included articles that allowed Venice to claim ownership over 
certain artwork.148 This treaty was one of the first attempts to deal 
with the issue of cultural heritage repatriation that occurs because of 
                                                            
144. See generally Wojciech W. Kowalski, Repatriation Of Cultural Property Following 
A Cession Of Territory Or Dissolution of Multinational States, 6 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 139, 
161 (2001) (examining cultural heritage repatriation issues following the cession of territory or 
the dissolution of multinational States). See, e.g., ANA FILIPA VRDOLJAK, ENFORCEMENT OF 
RESTITUTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE THROUGH PEACE AGREEMENTS, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW 33 (Francesco Francioni & James Gordley eds., 
2013) (arguing that post-First World War Treaties created principles that remain in current 
international laws for the protection of cultural heritage); Andrzej Jakubowski, National 
Museums in the Context of State Succession: The Negotiation of Difficult Pasts in the Post-
Cold War Reality, in NATIONAL MUSEUMS AND THE NEGOTIATION OF DIFFICULT PASTS 19 
(Dominique Poulot, José María Lanzarote Guiral & Felicity Bodenstein eds., 2013), available 
at http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/082/ecp12082.pdf (explaining that the allocation and distribution 
of national cultural treasures in cases of state succession have since the end of World War I 
have been essentially based on the territorial origin of artworks and the cultural significance of 
such items for new nation-states).  
145. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (examining the peace treaties that 
attempted to apportion cultural heritage after disputes).  
146. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 22 (arguing that peace agreements have been 
especially important in the formulation of international protection of cultural heritage from the 
early 20th century to the present); Kowalski, supra note 144, at 163 (same).  
147. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 140 (explaining that the Austrio-Hungarian Empire 
was forced to cede several Italian territories, including the former Republic of Venice; cf. 
Treaty of Peace between Austria-Hungary and Italy, signed at Vienna, 3 October 1866, 133 
Consol. T.S. 209.  
148. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 140 (observing that the Italians initiated attempts 
to repossess all works of art, historical objects and archives which at the time of the Habsburg 
reign had been removed from Italy); cf. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (claiming that the 
provisions were fueled by the ambitions of the new States and territories to recreate a national 
culture).  
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border changes in Europe.149 The cultural heritage objects were 
divided based on their territorial links with the new State claiming 
ownership and principles of reciprocity to lessen acrimony during the 
process.150 For example, under the Austro-Italian Treaty, the Italian 
party repossessed cultural property that had important connections to 
the ceded territory, Venice.151 The treaty also specified that Austria 
retained ownership titles, which could be found in the archives and 
specifically pertained to the Austrian territory.152 One of the most 
difficult cases in assigning cultural heritage rights arising out of the 
Austro-Italian treaty was Raphael’s Madonna; the painting was kept 
in Florence but was claimed by the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand on 
the basis that the Grand Duke of Tuscany had ownership of the 
painting.153 The issue was resolved when the parties agreed to allow 
the painting to stay in Florence, but it had to be marked the “Grand 
Duke’s Madonna” in honor of Ferdinand.154 The Austro-Italian case 
study is an example of the kinds of diplomatic solutions that came 
about prior to the contemporary cultural heritage treaties and 
illustrates how compromises are made when politics are intertwined 
with cultural heritage issues.155  
Following World War I, cultural heritage division was also 
addressed in the St. Germain Treaty of 1919 between the Allies and 
Austria, and the Trianon Treaty of 1920 signed by the Allies and 
                                                            
149. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 140 (examining the process of Italy’s claims as it 
has been formally incorporated into the empire); cf. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (noting 
that the treaty provisions signaled the idea of national cultural patrimony and the claims of 
successor States).  
150. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141 (emphasizing the restoration of the historical 
integrity of Venice); VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (affirming that the restitution of 
cultural property was based on territoriality and State succession).  
151. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141 (including a number of great Italian works of 
art); see also VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 33 (maintaining that the new States and territories 
saw the repatriation of culture heritage as a small step in righting a historic wrong). 
152. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141 (specifying the principle of reciprocity); cf. 
VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (pointing out that Austria, as the predecessor state resisted 
the dismantling of the Viennese collection). 
153. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 141-42 (clarifying that the Duke’s claims were 
based on his former honour as the Grand Duke of Tuscany); cf. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 
32 (discussing Austria’s position that the cultural objects were part of imperial collections 
forming part of its national heritage).  
154. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  
155. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 142 (suggesting that alternative solutions may be 
better than forcing judgment on ownership); Jakubowski, supra note 144, at 23 (recognizing 
that cultural cooperation and protection of cultural heritage serve as efficient tools in post-
conflict reconciliation and stabilization of States and their boundaries).  
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Hungary.156 The treaties contained provisions for the repatriation of 
cultural property tied to the ceased territory, if the claimed objects had 
been removed from that territory at the stipulated time before the 
war.157 Both treaties stated that:  
[A]ll artistic, archaeological, scientific or historic objects which 
are part of the collections formerly belonging to the Government 
or Crown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy—unless decreed 
otherwise, Austria as well as Hungary acknowledge to enter into 
negotiations aimed at amicable agreement with the States 
concerned and at their request, on the basis of which all the said 
parts, objects and documents which belong to the cultural 
heritage (patrimoine intellectuel) of the said States shall on the 
principle of reciprocity be returned to their respective State of 
origin.158 
These territorial repatriation clauses were adopted in an attempt 
to restore the integrity of the cultural heritage of territories or States 
that recovered lost lands or developed new State systems under the 
treaties.159 In article 195 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the treaty 
created an adjudication procedure to resolve cultural heritage claims 
by various successor States to be overseen by the Reparations 
Commission.160 The Reparations Commission appointed a committee 
to examine how objects in Austria’s possession were removed from 
Italy, Belgium, Poland, or Czechoslovakia.161 The committee mostly 
dealt with claims for cultural objects purchased by a reigning 
Hapsburg monarch.162  
                                                            
156. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 142 nn.7, 8 (citing the mentioned treaties); 
VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 33 (addressing that the Treaty of St. Germain created a 
Repatriation Committee).  
157. Kowalski, supra note 144, at 143 (describing repatriation based on territoriality); cf. 
VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 33 (affirming that the Treaty of Saint-Germain favored the 
principle of territoriality).  
158. Kowalski, supra note 144, at 145 (quoting Article 196 of the St Germain treaty and 
Article 177 of the Trianon Treaty). 
159. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 32 (claiming that the redistribution of cultural 
property was an attempt for new States and territories to recreate, or create for the first time, a 
national culture); Kowalski, supra note 144, at 145 (same).  
160. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 34 (clarifying that the procedure would resolve 
claims by various successor States); Treaty of Peace between Allied and Associated Power and 
Austria, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 8, art. 195 
[hereinafter “The Treaty of St. Germain”] (specifying that Italy and Austria agree to accept the 
decisions of the Committee). 
161. The Treaty of St. Germain, supra note 160, art. 195 (stating that the Committee was 
to examine how the art objects were “carried off” from the claiming State or territory).  
162. Id. (specifying the House of Hapsburg and other Houses reigning in Italy).  
1288 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1261 
The repatriation cases involving the Hapsburg monarch, 
however, always went in favor of the monarch over the claimant 
State.163 Claimant States would argue that the objects were part of 
their “public domain” and should be returned upon the dissolution of 
the empire.164 Austria argued that the States could not have a legal 
claim over the objects because they became the “personal property of 
the Hapsburg monarch” when they were purchased.165 In all the cases 
dealing with the Hapsburg monarch, Austria’s personal property 
rights claim won over the “public domain” argument.166  
The Committee categorically rejected the Czechoslovak 
argument that it should ‘right a historic wrong’ by reversing the 
centralizing policies of the Hapsburg monarchy which for 
centuries had removed cultural heritage from all corners of its 
empire. It also refused to ‘be guided by justice, equity[,] and 
good faith[,’] maintaining it had no authority to deviate from 
established judicial methods.167 
Hungary also protested the “territorial link” in repatriation cases 
as the trigger for selecting and returning certain objects to ceded 
territories.168 It advocated for the principle of nationality so that the 
Hungarian people could claim their cultural heritage “regardless of 
the territory of post-war Hungary.”169  
The Treaty of Peace with Italy, signed in 1947, included clauses 
concerning territorial concessions in favor of new borders, including 
border corrections for the benefit of France, certain territories ceded 
to Yugoslavia, or several islands conveyed to Greece.170 Appendix 
                                                            
163. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 35 (explaining that even though claims were 
between two States, the Committee would rely on predecessor State constitutional 
arrangements); Kowalski, supra note 144 at, 144 (musing that very few claims were submitted 
and the Committee did not find the grounds to uphold them). 
164. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 34-35 (describing the principle of territorial 
importance) 
165. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 35 (emphasizing the principle of property).  
166. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
167. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 35 (ignoring the unequal relations between the 
parties that had created the dispute in the first place).  
168. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 36 (referring to the Treaty of Trianon); Kowalski, 
supra note 144, at 145 (same).  
169. See VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 36 (mentioning that the territorial principle 
remained supreme despite Hungary’s assertions).  
170. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 153 (explaining that the general principle of 
repatriation expressed in this treaty was based on the criterion of the ties of a given object to 
the cultural heritage of the ceded territory); Treaty of Peace with Italy, Paris, 10 February 
1947, 61 Stat. 1245 (referencing the victory of the Allies).  
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XIV of the Treaty contained the following important repatriation 
clause, pursuant to which the Italian government was obliged to hand 
over to the above-mentioned successor States: “[A]ll objects of 
artistic, historic[,] or archeological value belonging to the cultural 
heritage of the ceased territory, which, at the time of Italian rule, had 
been removed from the said territory without any compensation and 
are in the possession of the Italian government or Italian public 
institutions.”171  
The general “principle of repatriation” expressed in this clause is 
based on the ties the claimed object had to the cultural heritage of the 
ceded territory.172  
As the above case studies demonstrate, post-war efforts to return 
cultural heritage to ceding states and their emphasis on territoriality 
are important precedents for contemporary cultural property law.173 
The common theme to be drawn from the above discussion on 
international agreements is that they all adopted the principle of 
territorial ties.174 The territorial criteria were used primarily for 
practical reasons so claims would provide the correct documentation 
as proof.175 This similar principle would later be emphasized by the 
international UNESCO conventions created to protect cultural 
property and create a mechanism to allow Nation-States to initiate 
repatriation claims.176 
With differing national narratives, there were inevitable 
arguments between the Predecessor State and Successor State over 
the same property.177 As the following case demonstrates, despite the 
                                                            
171. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 153. 
172. See id. (citing the case of Yugoslavia as the above clause was even extended to 
include objects that were removed after World War I.). 
173. See supra 146 and accompanying text (discussing the use of territorial links in 
cultural heritage distribution). 
174. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 163 (applying the principle of territorial ties and 
appurtenance to the “patrimoine intellectuel”); see also VRDOLJAK, supra note 157, at 38 
(expounding on how post-war efforts “fostered an environment . . . . for the restitution of 
cultural objects which were illicitly removed from their country of origin”). 
175. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 164 (acknowledging that in the absence of 
documentation, a more general criterion of appurtenance to the “patrimoine intellectual” of a 
given nationis employed); cf. Jakubowski, supra note 144, at 23 (asserting that the principle of 
territoriality could provide conveniently predictable solutions but cannot be consistently 
applied to all the scenarios).  
176. See supra notes 102, 105 and accompanying text (introducing the UNESCO 
conventions).  
177. VRDOLJAK, supra note 144, at 34 (acknowledging that the symbolic significance of 
the possession of the disputed cultural objects for both national identities rendered them 
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principles and rules for cultural property repatriation set forth in laws 
and treaties, the reality of cultural property ownership can produce 
harsh results that only fuel animosity among countries or cultural 
groups.178  
B. The Border Dispute Surrounding the Temple of Preah Vihear 
The Preah Vihear case shows the long-term damaging effects 
that a heritage dispute can have on countries when politics and 
territorial borders are emphasized over cultural significance.179 Preah 
Vihear is an eleventh century Hindu Temple built on the border of 
Cambodia and Thailand.180 Both Cambodia and Thailand claimed 
ownership over the temple and the surrounding area.181 The ICJ was 
asked to decide the border dispute between the two countries.182 In 
1962, the ICJ came to its decision by looking at the 1904 boundary 
settlement between Thailand and France, as Cambodia was a French 
                                                                                                                                     
problematic); Jakubowski, supra note 144, at 23 (pointing out that the rights of successor 
states based on the territorial linkage were often challenged by the principle of their great 
importance to the intellectual patrimony and cultural identity of the predecessor state).  
178. See generally Lucas Lixinski et al., Identity Beyond Borders: International Cultural 
Heritage Law and the Temple of Preah Vihear Dispute, 20 ILSA Q. 30 (2011) (concluding 
that the ICJ made a mistake by not considering culture and history when deciding the dispute 
over the Preah Vihear Temple); Monticha Pakdeekong, Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? 
A Thai Position, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 229 (2009) (arguing that the Decision of the 
International Court of Justice on June 15, 1962, did not, as claimed by Cambodia in 1959, 
determine any land boundary between Thailand and Cambodia); Bora Touch, Who Owns the 
Preah Vihear Temple? A Cambodian Position, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 205 (2009) 
(maintaining that the ICJ decision did determine a boundary between Thailand and Cambodia). 
179. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (introducing the Preah Vihear case 
study).  
180. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (describing that the Temple overlooks the 
Cambodian plains to the south, and Thailand to the north.); Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 
229 (noting that both Cambodians and Thais enjoyed the Temple for religious purposes, 
conducting trade, and it served as the centre between the high-Khmer and the low-Khmer 
communities).  
181. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (referring to the 192 ICJ cases); 
Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 230 (explaining that the dispute originated due to the 
ambiguous frontier line constituted by the provisions of the 1904 and 1907 Siam-Franco 
treaties). 
182. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (analyzing the case as a textbook example 
of the application of the doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel because, according to the 
judgment of the ICJ, Thailand’s lack of protest until the case was initiated in 1962 amounted to 
an endorsement of the boundary as set in the French treaties). See generally Case Concerning 
the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6 [hereinafter 
the Preah Vihear Case] (rejecting the objection of the Government of Thailand and finding that 
it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it on Oct. 6, 1959 by the 
Application of the Government of Cambodia). 
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protectorate.183 The settlement included maps that were drawn by 
French geographers and gave the disputed area to Cambodia.184 The 
ICJ found that because Thailand never protested the maps, they were 
still controlling and the disputed area belonged to Cambodia.185 
Despite this decision, between 1962 and 2011 there were recurrent 
violent protests and boundary disputes, even after the Thai 
government issued a statement reiterating its compliance with the ICJ 
judgment.186  
The ICJ expressly dismissed the application of cultural heritage 
laws when making the 1962 judgment holding that, “[t]he Parties 
have also relied on other arguments of a physical, historical, religious 
and archeological character but the Court is unable to regard them as 
legally decisive.”187 In a separate opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice further 
explained that the Treaty between France and Siam (now Thailand) 
must take precedence over any cultural or historical evidence.188 
Judge Fitzmaurice wrote: “[E]xtraneous factors which might have 
weighed . . . in making that settlement, and more particularly in 
determining how the line of the frontier was to run, can only have an 
incidental relevance in determining where today, as a matter of law, it 
does run.”189  
The Preah Vihear situation suggests that the ICJ viewed history 
and culture as only secondary in determining ownership of the 
                                                            
183. See Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182, at 19 (analyzing the 1904 Treaty).  
184. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (including the map from the ICJ 
Judgment); Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 231 (arguing that the Court did not rule that the 
map showed the frontier line between Thailand and Cambodia).  
185. See Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182, at 22 (determining that the borders outlined 
on the map was communicated to the Thai members of the Mixed Commission).  
186. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 32 (explaining that the Thai population 
accused Cambodia and the ICJ of stealing the country’s territory and cultural landmark); 
Pakdeekong, supra note 178, at 233 (adding that the Thai government formally informed the 
UN Acting Secretary-General on July 6, 1962, that the government “desires to make an 
express reservation regarding whatever rights Thailand has, or may have in the future, to 
recover the Temple of [Preah Vihear] . . . and to register a protest against the decision of the 
International Court of Justice”).  
187. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vinher (Cambodia v. Thai.) 1962 I.C.J. 6, 13 
(June 15) (Merits).  
188. Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice), as 
quoted in Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (shedding light on why the Court dismissed 
evidence related to the historical, cultural and archaeological importance of the Temple). 
189. See id. (declining to consider the importance of historical or cultural context).  
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temple.190 The people of Thailand and Cambodia felt differently.191 
While decisive legal conclusions are important, some cultural heritage 
scholars believe that courts should consider, and cultural heritage law 
should reflect, the complications and nuances involved in disputes to 
try to come to a better solution for the people involved.192  
Preah Vihear draws interesting parallels to the current dispute in 
Ukraine as both situations deal with a cultural heritage issues that 
emerged from a border dispute.193 The ICJ emphasized the treaty and 
the legal documents to make a decision, but it did not necessarily 
solve the underlying issue or create the most ethical of conclusions.194 
The same result may repeat itself with the current art dispute between 
Ukraine and Crimea.  
C. Soviet Union Case Studies  
Another example of the difficulties involved in a cultural 
repatriation lies in Russia’s history with art property, which may set a 
negative precedent for Crimea’s museums. Courts in England and 
France considered cases that dealt with the nationalization of private 
assets by the Soviet Union.195 The outcome in both cases, as 
                                                            
190. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (referring to the language of Judge 
Fitzmaurice); Preah Vihear Case, supra note 182 (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice), 51-
53 (saying that “for these factors to have any serious influence, it would at least be necessary 
that they should all point in the same direction, and furnish unambiguous indications”). 
191. See Saing Soenthrith & Zsombor Peter, Military Protests New Thai Fence Near 
Preah Vihear, CAMBODIA DAILY (June 2, 2014), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/
military-protests-new-thai-fence-near-preah-vihear-border-60141/ (reporting that Cambodia 
has accused the Thai army of erecting a new barbed wire fence on land near Preah Vihear 
temple, and has asked Thailand to tear it down); Ouch Sony & George Wright, Preah Vihear 
Villagers Staying at Pagoda March to National Assembly, CAMBODIA DAILY (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/preah-vihear-villagers-staying-at-pagoda-march-to-
assembly-72512/ (claiming that soldiers dismantled houses and farms on the land surrounding 
Preah Vihear temple).  
192. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (dismissing the reasoning used in the ICJ 
judgment the product of a different era); STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 252 (arguing that 
cultural property law should reflect certain ethical guiding principles like humanitarian 
considerations).  
193. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ukraine-Crimea art 
conflict occurred only after Russia annexed Crimea). Preah Vihear occurred due to a border 
dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. See supra note 178 and accompanying text 
(explaining the Preah Vihear dispute).  
194. See Lixinski et al., supra note 178, at 35 (referring to the violence that occurred 
after the judgment); Soenthrith, supra note 191 (same).  
195. See SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34 (describing the Princess Paley Olga v. 
Weisz case); Jane Graham, “From Russia” Without Love: Can The Shchukin Heirs Recover 
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illustrated below, was that seizures of private art were legal because 
of the “Act of State doctrine.”196 This parallels the current situation 
with the art conflict where the Dutch court may not be able to rule in 
favor of the Crimean museums because they have to uphold the 
national laws of Ukraine.  
In Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, Princess Paley Olga, the widow 
of Russian Grand Duke Paul, who was arrested in 1918, was 
requisitioned and her valuable furniture and works of art were taken 
by the Soviet government.197 The Soviet Union then sold some of her 
artwork.198 Once she found out that her artwork was in England, she 
sued the new owner of the artworks, Weisz.199 The reviewing English 
court considered a decree issued by the All-Russian Central 
Committee and the People’s Commissariat of March 18, 1923, under 
which all works of art and antiquities became the property of the 
State, as well as a decree signed by Lenin on March 5, 1921, 
according to which the property of citizens who have fled the 
Republic were now the property of the Russian Soviet Socialist 
Republic.200 Both decrees were regarded as valid by the court because 
the confiscation of property by a foreign government recognized by 
the Crown could not be called into question.201 In essence, the courts 
could not rule against the laws of a “recognized foreign power” in a 
case dealing with that country’s citizens.202 
Similarly, in the Shchukin litigation, Irina Shchukina, the 
daughter of a famous Russian art collector and a descendent of 
                                                                                                                                     
Their Ancestor’s Art Collection?, 6 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 71 (2009) (recounting 
the Shchukina litigation).  
196. See SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34 (explaining that the Act of State 
doctrine provides that courts of a country recognizing the legitimacy of a foreign government 
cannot overrule the laws of the same foreign government on the issue of property as long as 
the situation only deals with the other country’s citizens); cf. Graham, supra note 195, at 96-97 
(emphasizing that the nationalization of a recognized government destroyed any personal titles 
people may have).  
197. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34 (recounting the personal history of the 
claimant); Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, [1929] 1 K.B. 718 at 722-23 (Eng.) (same). 
198. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (establishing the facts of the case).  
199. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 34-35 (noting that Princess Paley also claimed 
compensation for damages); Princess Paley, supra note 197, at 722 (same).  
200. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (explaining the decrees signed by Lenin to 
nationalize important artwork); Princess Paley, supra note 197, at 722-23 (affirming that the 
paintings were in a State museum pursuant to the decrees).  
201. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (restating the Act of State doctrine); 
Princess Paley, supra note 197, at 723-24 (asserting the recognition of the Soviet government 
by France). 
202. See supra note 196 (discussing the Act of State doctrine).  
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Morozov, another prominent art collector, lost both art collections to 
the Soviet Union by way of decrees in 1918.203 Following the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, Schukina and Morozov made a claim for their 
lost artwork while some of the pieces were on loan from Russia in the 
Centre Pompidou in Paris.204 A French court denied their claims 
because France accepts decrees of nationalization issued by 
recognized foreign governments, such as the Soviet Union, 
concerning their own territory and people.205 These two cases 
illustrate that repatriation may be difficult in situations where the law 
is against the claimant.206 If these same principles are applied to the 
Scythian gold on loan in the Netherlands, the Crimean museums may 
face similar difficulties as they will have to argue for cultural 
repatriation against Ukrainian laws and possibly international 
conventions.  
The three case studies examined in Part II involve cultural 
heritage disputes that are different from the current dispute between 
Crimea and Ukraine.207 However, they each contain similar elements 
and principles that prove to illustrate what arguments may prevail in 
the art dispute. The treaties that dealt with the breakup of States and 
State succession emphasized territoriality when dividing cultural 
property.208 This principle was also used in the international 
conventions created to protect cultural heritage such as the 1954 
Hague Convention and the UNESCO Conventions.209 Second, courts 
may have to decide disputes based on the law (or a treaty) instead of 
                                                            
203. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (describing the facts of the Shchukina 
litigation); Graham, supra note 195, at 70 (highlighting that Ivan Morozov’s home was to 
become a museum of Modem Western Art and would be opened to the public).  
204. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35 (clarifying that the paintings were on loan 
from the Pushkin and Hermitage museums in Russia); Graham, supra note 195, at 71 (same).  
205. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 36 (citing the Act of State doctrine); Graham, 
supra note 195, at 71-72 (musing that the French government asked Madame Matisse to 
approach Irina Shchukin and make her promise that she would not try to institute another 
lawsuit if the paintings in question were displayed in Paris again). 
206. SCHÖNENBERGER, supra note 63, at 35-36 (recounting that both individual parties 
lost to the decree of the government). See generally Princess Paley, supra note 197 (ruling 
based on the Act of State doctrine). 
207. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the art dispute). 
208. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (introducing the principle of 
territoriality in international treaties).  
209. See Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, supra note 101, at 845-46 
(discussing the emphasis of the State in international cultural heritage conventions); 
STAMATOUDI, supra note 63, at 216 (same).  
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taking the cultural history into consideration.210 While it is important 
that courts follow laws instead of personal morals, this does not 
always lead to the best result for the cultural heritage and the people 
affected by the decisions.211 Finally, the cases dealing with Soviet Art 
nationalization illustrate that courts will not go against the laws of a 
recognized country like Ukraine, to satisfy a personal cultural heritage 
claim.212  
III. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRECEDENTS TO 
THE CONFLICT 
Unfortunately, this conflict may result in a battle between legal 
and moral principles where the moral arguments do not hold up.213 By 
cultural heritage moral standards, including the physical preservation 
and integrity of the objects, the artifacts on loan should go back to 
where they originated, to the museums that have continuously 
preserved and studied them.214 The Netherlands, however, has not 
recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea and must fulfill its 
obligations to Ukraine.215 Part III first analyzes the applicability of the 
international cultural heritage conventions and national laws, and 
second draws important lessons from the case studies examined 
above. 
Regardless of the label given to the crisis in Ukraine, the Hague 
Convention could still apply because Crimea was occupied by 
Russian troops.216 Ukraine could argue that the Netherlands has a duty 
under the UNESCO Convention and the Hague Convention to keep 
the objects safe and out of the hands of the occupying hostile State.217 
The biggest problem for the Crimean museums is that the entire rest 
                                                            
210. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (dismissing the historical, physical or 
archeological arguments).  
211. See Soenthrith, supra note 191 (referring to the protests and altercations); Sony, 
supra note 191 (same).  
212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the Act of State doctrine). 
213. Dutch Foreign Ministry, supra note 71, ¶ 10 (referring to the assessment of the 
dispute by the director of the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia). 
214. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining the ethical principles 
involved in cultural heritage repatriation arguments). 
215. Durr, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3, 4, 11 (discussing the Netherlands’ obligation to Ukraine); 
Neuendorf, supra note 9 (same).  
216. Ukraine Crisis, supra note 29, ¶¶ 4, 18 (describing the Russian unmarked troops); 
Ukraine Creates a Special Legal Regime in Crimea, supra note 131, ¶ 10.  
217. See Hague Convention, supra note 79, art. 4, ¶ 3; 1970 UNESCO Convention, 
supra note 93, art. 11. 
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of the world does not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea.218 
The Dutch Court may feel compelled politically to return the objects 
to Kiev instead of effectively handing them over to Russia.219 
Moreover, there is no precedent for courts to overrule the law of 
another recognized country for moral reasons alone.220  
The cultural heritage case studies consistently show that courts 
and treaties favor and protect the cultural heritage of a State instead of 
the people.221 Although at first glance it appears that the emphasis on 
territoriality in the treaties supported the return of the objects to 
Crimea, a deeper analysis reveals that such treaty provisions were 
used to emphasize State supremacy “even at the expense of the 
principle of protecting the integrity of important collections, together 
with the consistent application of reciprocity.”222 Because Crimea is 
not an independent territory and the Netherlands does not recognize 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the emphasis on State supremacy may 
mean that Crimean museums will not be able to legally defend their 
arguments for the return of the art objects.223 Unless the loan 
agreements clearly show that museum ownership overrules the State’s 
claim to ownership, the Crimean museums do not have a good case.224  
CONCLUSION 
Existing laws and the past examples examined in this Note do 
not create a hopeful situation for the Crimean museums. Although the 
Crimean museums make a strong moral argument for why the 
artifacts should go back to Crimea, there is little legal precedent that 
will support the museum’s claim to the artifacts. The words of Dr. 
Mikhail Piotrovsky, the Director General of the State Hermitage 
Museum in St Petersburg, supports this Note’s conclusions: “[f]rom 
                                                            
218. See Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, supra note 15, at 2 (calling upon all States not 
to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea).  
219. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the complicated political 
nature of the art dispute).  
220. See supra note 196 (discussing the Act of State doctrine).  
221. See Lixinski, supra note 178, at 35 (discussing the ICJ’s refusal to apply historical 
and archeological arguments to the Preah Vihear case); supra note 196 and accompanying text 
(defining the Act of State doctrine).  
222. See Kowalski, supra note 144, at 145 (asserting that this was done to restore the 
integrity of the culture of the new State or territory).  
223. See supra note 157 and accompanying text (regarding the emphasis on State 
supremacy and the principle of territoriality).   
224. Durr, supra note 1, ¶¶ 3, 5, 10 (discussing the loan agreements between the Allard 
Pierson Museum, Ukraine, and the Crimean museums).  
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the ethical grounds, the exhibits should return to the museums where 
they have been kept for hundreds of years but from the legal angle of 
view, they may belong to the museum fund of the country, from the 
territory of which they were loaned.”225 This outcome is unfortunate 
because it shows that international and domestic laws do not provide 
for the most moral result. 
A possible solution is to find an alternative to a legal judgment. 
For example, the parties could agree to let the Netherlands keep the 
collections until the political situation is resolved. Another solution 
might be for the parties to allow the collections to continue traveling 
and touring museums abroad, furthering the goals of cultural 
cooperation and diplomacy, until a fair solution is agreed to by all 
involved. While a bilateral agreement is unlikely because of the 
current tumultuous relationship between Russia and Ukraine, an 
alternative solution will allow the parties to rise above the politicized 
nature of the dispute and work together to find a solution that protects 
the cultural heritage itself.  
                                                            
225. Dutch Foreign Ministry, supra note 71, ¶ 11 (calling for a professional, ethical and 
legal discussion of the dispute).  
